The July Crisis: A Month That Has Defined Humanity Since

Fred Teasdale

The July Crisis is often thought of as just a series of events, events that naturally followed the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand on June 28, 1914, leading to the outbreak of war on July 28, 1914. It is only when we look at the impact of World War One that we see how pivotal this period was in human history. Without World War One, there would have been no World War Two, no Cold War, no humanity perilously close to nuclear armageddon, and probably no 9/11. World War One is the defining moment of the 20th century, not the Second World War, as some may believe. This seminal catastrophe set humanity on a path of merciless destruction and allowed the tyranny of the 20th century to unfold. Thus, the July Crisis must be crucially studied, not just as a month that deserves a single line in the history books, but as a period defined by the largely unknown individuals at the heart of the Russian, German, and French empires, characterised by miscommunication, complacency, and plain stupidity.

To begin with, the traditional narrative posits that the complex web of alliances—the Triple Entente of Russia, Great Britain, and France, and the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austro-Hungary, and Italy—meant that war was just waiting to happen. This view is overly simplistic. From 1815 at the end of the Napoleonic Wars, Europe had been in a period of relative peace. Wars continued, some, such as the Crimean War, having major implications for regimes, but the great powers of Europe managed to navigate this increasingly complex and interconnected world. Why then would 1914 bring this war? It is undeniable that countries such as Germany had unresolved territorial ambitions, with Germany’s unification in 1871 creating a superpower Europe had never seen. Otto von Bismarck, Germany’s chancellor during this period, worked tirelessly to prevent war, famously claiming that a war would start by some ‘damn thing in the Balkans’ and working hard to avoid the eventual Franco-Russian alliance to prevent Germany from feeling surrounded. But in 1914, Germany was not actively seeking conflict. It may have been preparing for war, but it did not have any pressing territorial ambitions. What then was the cause of this war?

The clearest answer is the assassination of Austro-Hungarian Archduke Franz Ferdinand by a Serbian group in Bosnia. This is often taught as the trigger for World War One. Yet when Ferdinand was assassinated, the details of which were farcical in nature, war was not inevitable. Admittedly, the assassination naturally incensed the Austrians, who gave the Serbians a list of seemingly unmakeable demands, the most severe being giving Austrians control over the Serbian police force. Serbia initially agreed to all of these demands, only refusing when they found out that the Russians had mobilised their forces in their defence. This moment, where history seems determined by the smallest coincidences and longstanding alliances, such as Russia’s with Serbia, shows how unlikely these events were. Furthermore, the Germans were angry at the sedate pace of the Austrians. They wanted a quick war when sympathy for Austria was high, to avoid a global conflict. After three weeks had passed with little action from Austria, the conflict had partially abated. But the real problems lay in the minds of the men at the time.

Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany incredibly went on holiday for two weeks during July. If he had been present, relations might not have been handled by unknown bureaucrats. For example, Leopold Berchtold, foreign minister of Austria, believed that being at war wasn’t the same as declaring war and that if Austria just invaded Belgrade in Serbia, less than ten miles from the Austro-Hungarian border, they could claim a quick and decisive victory. These moments defined the July Crisis. Men in empires facing deep problems chose the option that gave them a chance for glory but led to destruction. Perhaps the most tragic was Tsar Nicholas II of Russia, a man who had always struggled to assert authority. When the Russians debated, he walked away, and an aide, whose name has been lost to history, is reported to have said, ‘Your Majesty, we know how difficult this must be for you to decide,’ cutting into the Tsar’s feelings and causing him to declare war to appear strong. Finally, the German Ambassador to Russia, Friedrich Pourtalès, is said to have been on his knees to Sergei Sazonov, Russian foreign minister, begging him to call off mobilisation. He claimed it would be the end of empires, and he was right. By 1918, the German, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian empires would all be finished, drowned in a sea of bodies, overthrown by their own people.

The July Crisis was not a simple box-ticking exercise. It was not just a list of declarations of war from each major power. When history is distilled to facts, we might see these events as X declared war on Y and so on. But the July Crisis is a story of utmost tragedy. The assassination of Franz Ferdinand did not have to mean war. While it was likely to lead to some localised conflict, it did not have to mean a global conflict as tragic as this. When Pourtalès begged for war to be avoided, a month later a million men would be dead, dying in a pointless conflict, fought over confusion and meaningless alliances. Thus, the July Crisis must be remembered as a month that defines humanity, not just because of what it meant but because of how it shows humans acting in times of crisis. Humanity often refuses to see the bigger picture. We are focused on the next week, not the next year. The July Crisis should serve as a warning to keep level heads in times of crises; otherwise, there is no hope for humanity as a whole.

Bibliography

Clark, Christopher, The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 (London: Allen Lane, 2013)

Fromkin, David, Europe's Last Summer: Why the World Went to War in 1914 (London: Heinemann, 2004)

Otte, T. G., July Crisis: The World's Descent into War, Summer 1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015)

Williamson, Samuel R., Leopold Count Berchtold: The Man Who Could Have Prevented the Great War(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010)

The War to End All War, The Irish Times, https://www.irishtimes.com/culture/heritage/the-war-to-end-all-war-1.1786559 [accessed 30 July 2024]