rewind.
This piece was originally written in December 2022 and featured in The Looking Glass, an academic publication of Watford Boys’ Grammar School. It has since been edited by the author for this publication.
Introduction
When we hear the words “North Korea”, what comes to mind? A country with a strict communist regime? A country run by a brutal dictator with a cult of personality? A country whose frequent missile launches we should be afraid of? Academics and North Korean defectors alike have attempted to disprove popular assumptions that surround this country. For example, the assumption that North Korea is a country we know little about. “Contrary to media punditry,” writes the American historian Bruce Cumings, “we know a lot about it.” We have casualty figures from famines, testimonies from defectors, and much more.
To answer the question posed in this essay’s title, I will examine the social, political, and economic contentions of North Korea. By using arguments from historians and defectors, we can engage in a useful debate. It is essential that we do not perceive North Korea in a one-dimensional manner, and I therefore stress the need to interpret it sensitively.
Political Challenges
Three years after the Second World War ended, the Korean Peninsula was divided into a communist North Korea and a capitalist South Korea. However, in 1950, Kim Il-sung—the North Korean founder—launched an invasion of the South to consolidate communist control over the whole peninsula, an argument the North vehemently denies. The invasion resulted in American support for South Korea, and a bloody three-year conflict ensued, claiming nearly 5 million lives.
American tactics involved indiscriminately bombing towns and villages, bolstered by discoveries in a new weapon—napalm. By August 1950, American forces were dropping 800 tonnes of napalm on civilian settlements daily, even affecting their own forces. The reputed military leader Curtis LeMay concluded that America had bombed “every village” in both North and South Korea. America’s actions in the Korean War inspired the rise of the hardline cult of personality that would form the basis of today’s North Korea.
Having taken control of a decimated North Korea in 1950, Kim Il-sung used his newfound cult of personality as a platform to enforce historiographical change. The academic Leonid Petrov suggests that North Korean historians “began deifying Kim’s family members” to convince the North Korean people that the Kim family had opposed the Americans long before the Korean War. A retired North Korean military officer, Pak Chun-Gwong, was originally credited with defeating an American ship in 1866. However, in 1961, North Korean historians credited Kim’s great-great-grandfather with this achievement instead.
Through ideological reform and fabricated narratives stemming from the scars of the Korean War, Kim Il-sung constructed a society that isolated itself from the West. Simultaneously, an illusion was formed, one partly owing to American influences—the careless American tactics and the manipulation of North Korean history. The fact that neither side has signed formal legislation to end the Korean War suggests both countries intend to maintain their respective stances. Ultimately, the society built from these narratives would lead to further challenges from the West and within North Korea itself.
Social Factors
Influential North Korean defectors, such as Yeonmi Park and Kang Chol-hwan, have scathing attitudes towards the regime under which they lived. Analysing their perspectives helps us understand why they left such a tightly controlled country, but also how North Korea presented itself to these individuals—at least, how it tried to.
Only 10% of North Korean people live in Pyongyang, and they are the Kims’ most devoted followers. This explains Kang’s frequent reverence for Kim Jong-il, a “Father Christmas” figure who was building “an Edenic social state” for him. However, after falling out of favour with the government, Kang and his family were sent to the Yodok concentration camp. For ten years, they lived in squalor and witnessed public executions.
How does the West accommodate people from such a society, like North Korean defectors, and encourage them to think differently about the world around them? In 2020, I asked Park what the best part of living in America was. Her response:
"In other countries it would be easier for Kim Jong-un to hire a hitman to kill me. So America is definitely safer for that reason... I think a lot of Americans truly get the value of liberty and I think that’s really special for me because when I was born, I didn’t have it."
To defectors like Park, the West is a sanctuary from North Korean oppression. This does not prevent critics from voicing their opinions.
Cumings refutes the argument that North Korea runs a cult society much like those run by infamous cult leaders such as Jim Jones or Charles Manson. Rather, he reshapes this argument, asserting that North Korea is more like a “Confucian family state.” Given the evidence of punishment and defections, Cumings appears to take the Kims’ benevolence at face value. Once again, this proves that North Korea is far from the ideal society it professes to be.
Economic Factors
North Korea’s central ideology is Juche. This translates to “independence in politics, economics, defence, and ideology.” It was established in the 1950s following the Korean War and gave North Korea an internalised focus, free from foreign influence. In reality, the economy under Juche forced North Korea to depend on foreign nations for income.
In the 1970s, North Korea had high-quality cars and hospitals, and its GDP saw a 115% increase from 1974 to 1989. Kim Il-sung even adopted the economic method of his Chinese counterpart, Deng Xiaoping, known as ‘the mosquito net’, which harnessed economic potential without bringing Western ideology into North Korea. This system benefitted Kang after his release, as he used the North Korean black market to receive goods from his Japanese relatives. Superficially, North Korea appeared economically prosperous, but its dependence on its communist allies—China and Russia—proved devastating.
In 1995, North Korea was hit by terrible weather. By this time, China had embraced a modern economy, and the USSR had collapsed four years earlier. Without allies, North Korea was helpless, and that terrible weather led to an insurmountable famine. North Korea claims over 200,000 people died, while American estimates range from 500,000 to 3.5 million.
While North Korea might strive for economic prosperity, its economy is, in truth, extremely fragile. Its dependence on foreign powers benefits North Koreans with connections to illegal markets but disadvantages those without. This also calls into question the success of Juche. Although it remains prevalent in North Korea today, its supposed “independence” is merely a façade of power for the North Korean people.
Conclusion
In light of its social, economic, and political challenges, North Korea is undoubtedly an illusion. This illusion is a product of both American and North Korean influence. America’s influence can be seen not only through its actions in the Korean War but also in news outlets that caricature the North as an overtly paranoid nation, deepening the mystery surrounding North Korea. Nevertheless, we must be cautious about generalisations. Not every North Korean defector was as wealthy as Kang, and not every North Korean defector escaped as Park did.
It would be wrong to assume that every North Korean testimony is the same, but fundamentally, defectors flee because they realise the system under which they have been raised—Juche—has failed them. This essay has aimed to explore both North Korean and American positions in a nuanced manner. For example, one should not surmise that North Korea is America’s “punch bag,” as this implies North Korea is unwilling to retaliate. Indeed, North Korea was responsible for attacks on South Korean presidents, such as Park Chung-hee in 1973 and Chun Doo-hwan in 1980. Accountability from both sides would be a solution, possibly in the form of constructive dialogue. But for now, we must rely on the voices of North Korean defectors. They may not be politicians or diplomats, but they certainly have something valuable to say.
Bibliography
Bruce Cumings, North Korea: Another Country (New York: The New Press, 2003).
Dan Clifton, Nick Holt, and Ben Finney, dirs., Inside North Korea’s Dynasty (Washington, DC: National Geographic, 2018), Amazon Prime Video.
History.com Editors, ‘Korean War’, History.com, 2022 https://www.history.com/topics/korea/korean-war[accessed 15 August 2024].
Kang Chol-hwan, and Pierre Rigoulot, The Aquariums of Pyongyang (New York: Basic Books, 2001).
Son Hyemin, ‘North Koreans Reject Korean War Propaganda Claiming South Struck First’, Radio Free Asia, 2021 https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/625-06252021155957.htm [accessed 15 August 2024].
World Bank, ‘North Korea GDP’, Tradingeconomics.com, 2022 https://tradingeconomics.com/north-korea/gdp[accessed 15 August 2024].